Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence

Nir Dagan ()

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present two characterization results; both require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. One of them requires the allocations to be envy free (with respect to trades) and the other--stable with respect to bilateral recontracting. The characterizations hold in classes of exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, and also on domains with a finite number of potential agents.

Date: 1996-01
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Working Paper: Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence (1996)
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Address: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
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