Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition

Nir Dagan (), Roberto Serrano () and Oscar Volij
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Oscar Volij: http://volij.co.il

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible and indivisible goods.

Keywords: Finite coalitions and Edgworthian theory of exchange; marginal artes of substitution and Jevonsian theory of exchange; matching and bargaining; core; Walrasian equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D41 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 1996-06, Revised 1999-05

Published in Economic Theory 15:279-296 (2000)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition (2002)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition (1996)
Working Paper: Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition (1998)
Journal Article: research articles: Bargaining, coalitions and competition (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:014

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Address: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
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