Extensive Form Games with Coalitional Actions

Nir Dagan ()

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: I introduce a model of extensive form games with coalitional actions, which provides a formal framework for analysing situations in which coalitions of players may take joint actions sequentially. I present an equilibrium concept that generalizes subgame-perfect equilibrium, and is closely related to the core. The new theory provides insights into the theory of sequential economies.

Keywords: extensive form games with coalitional actions; backward induction; recontracting equilibrium; core; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 1995-12, Revised 1999-01

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:015

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Address: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
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