Nir Dagan (),
Roberto Serrano () and
Oscar Volij Additional contact information Oscar Volij: Department of Economics, Brown University, and Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem., http://volij.co.il/
Abstract:
We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits indivisible goods.
More papers in Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij Address: Oscar Volij, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel Series data maintained by Oscar Volij ().
This site is part of RePEc
and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to
contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .