The Time-Preference Nash Solution

Nir Dagan (), Oscar Volij and Eyal Winter ()
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Oscar Volij: Department of Economics, Brown University, and Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem., http://volij.co.il/

Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij

Abstract: We give an axiomatic characterization of the Time-Preference Nash Solution, a bargaining solution that is applied when the underlying preferences are defined over streams of physical outcomes. This bargaining solution is similar to the ordinal Nash solution introduced by Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992), but it gives a different prediction when the set of physical outcomes is a set of lotteries.

Keywords: bargaining; ordinal Nash solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2001-06-08
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Related works:
Working Paper: The time-preference Nash solution (2001)
Working Paper: The Time-Preference Nash Solution (2001)
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