Culture, nationality and demographics in ultimatum games
Anabela Botelho (),
Mark A. Hirsch and
Elisabet E. Rutstrom Additional contact information Mark A. Hirsch: Murray State University
Elisabet E. Rutstrom: University of South Carolina
Abstract:
We use experimental data collected in Russia and in the United States using a simple ultimatum game to evaluate two alternative hypotheses that may account for previously observed behavior in multinational experiments. One hypothesis postulates that behavioral differences observed in bargaining experiments arise from country-specific cultural environments. We submit the alternative hypothesis that different behavior in such experiments stems from differences in the demographic characteristics of the subject pools within each country. Because of its simplicity, our experimental design allows us to discriminate between these two hypotheses. Our findings support the alternative hypothesis.
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