Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study

Swee-Hoon Chuah (), Robert Hoffmann () and Lee Chew Ging ()

Occasional Papers from Nottingham University Business School

Abstract: This paper presents experimental evidence demonstrating that agents' knowledge of strategy alternatives in pure coordination games is inversely correlated with decision-making efficacy. Alternative theoretical accounts of players' choice processes in coordination games are considered to shed light on our empirical results.

Keywords: coordination; incomplete information; salience; curse of knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-mic
Date: 2004-03-05
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Working Paper: Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study (2004)
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