Immigration and voting on the size and the composition of public spending

Karin Mayr ()

No 2011001, Norface Discussion Paper Series from Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London

Abstract: This paper develops a model to analyze the effects of immigration by skill on the outcome of a majority vote among natives on both the size as well as the composition of public spending. Public spending can be of two types, spending on rival goods (transfers) and on non-rival goods (public goods). I find that the effect of immigration on public spending depends on preferences for the different types of spending. In particular, immigrants of either skill can increase (decrease) the size of total public spending, if natives have a relative preference for spending on public goods (spending on transfers). I provide some illustration of spending patterns in OECD countries during 1980 - 2010.

Keywords: immigration; political economy; transfers; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F2 H4 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mig and nep-pol
Date: 2011-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Immigration and voting on the size and the composition of public spending (2010)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nor:wpaper:2011001

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