Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance

Simon Ashby, Swee-Hoon Chuah () and Robert Hoffmann ()

Occasional Papers from Industrial Economics Division

Abstract: We analyse the possibility of successful industry self-regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this paper presents a game-theoretic typology of generic self-regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. Examples for the scenarios are discussed and conclusions for corporate and public policy offered.

Keywords: industry self-regulation; voluntary compliance; game theory; public goods; collective action. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D7 H11 K20 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2003-04-07
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http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/%7Elizecon/RePEc/pdf/selfreg.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2003)
Journal Article: Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nub:occpap:3

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