On the Relevance of Alternatives in Bargaining: Average Alternative Solutions

Younghwan In ()
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Younghwan In: National University of Singapore

Departmental Working Papers from National University of Singapore, Department of Economics

Abstract: We compare bargaining solutions in terms of the relevance of alternatives. We show that most well-known bargaining solutions do not use all the alternatives, but there are numerous bargaining solutions that do. We introduce a new class of bargaining solutions called ``average alternative solutions'', characterize them, and show that the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are limits of average alternative solutions. We also provide alternative characterizations for the Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

Keywords: bargaining; solutions; axioms; relevance of alternatives; average alternative solutions; monotonic bounds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-09
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