EconPapers has moved to http://EconPapers.repec.org! Please update your bookmarks.
Discussion Papers
from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014. Contact information at EDIRC . Series data maintained by Fran Walker ().
Access Statistics for this working paper series.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series .
1480: Discounting and Patience in Optimal Stopping and Control Problems
John K. -H Quah and Bruno H. Strulovici
1479: Affiliation and Dependence in Economic Models
Luciano I. de Castro
1478: Capital Mobility and Asset Pricing
Darrell Duffie and Bruno H. Strulovici
1477: A Relationship Between Risk and Time Preferences
Kota Saito
1476: Information Independence and Common Knowledge
Olivier Gossner , Ehud Kalai and Robert Weber
1475: Diversity and Popularity in Social Networks
Yann Bramoullé and Brian Rogers
1474: The Dynamics of Climate Agreements
Bard Harstad
1473: Program Equilibria and Discounted Computation Time
Lance Fortnow
1472: Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses
Simon Loertscher and Andras F. Niedermayer
1471: Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
Mallesh M. Pai and Rakesh Vohra
1470: Topologies on Types: Connections
Yi-Chun Chen and Siyang Xiong
1469: Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection
Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade and Luciano I. de Castro
1468: Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
Eran Hanany and Peter Klibanoff
1467: The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms
Artyom Shneyerov and Adam Chi Leung Won
1466: Existence and Computation of Pure-strategy Equilibria in Models of Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
Pohan Fong
1465: Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power
Pohan Fong
1464: Endogenous Limits on Proposal Power
Daniel Diermeier and Pohan Fong
1463: Equilibria Existence in Regular Discontinuous Games
Luciano I. de Castro
1462: Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
1461: Optimal Dynamic Auctions
Mallesh Pai and Rakesh Vohra
1460: Constrainted Optimization Approaches to Estimation of Structural Models
Che-Lin Su and Kenneth L. Judd
1459: Defense Policies Against Currency Attacks: on the Possibility of Predictions in a Global Game with Multiple Equilibria
George-Marios Angeletos , Alessandro Pavan and Christian Hellwig
1458: Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games
Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan
1457: Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals
Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan
1456: Long-Term Contracting in a Changing World
Alessandro Pavan
1455: Vector Expected Utility and Attitudes toward Variation
Marciano Siniscalchi
1454: Jump Bidding and Budget Constraints in All-Pay Auctions and Wars of Attrition
Eddie Dekel , Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky
1453: Information Independence and Common Knowledge
Olivier Gossner , Ehud Kalai and Robert Weber
1452: Do side payments help? Collective decisions and strategic delegation
Bard Harstad
1451: The Dynamics of Distributive Politics
Marco Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey
1450: Dynamic Cost-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising
Hamid Nazerzadeh , Amin Saberi and Rakesh Vohra
1449: Games in Coalitional Form
Ehud Kalai
1448: Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
First:Birgit Heydenreich , Rudolf Müller , Marc Uetz and Rakesh Vohra
1447: Stock Options and Chief Executive Compensation
Christopher Armstrong , David Larcker and Che-Lin Su
1446: A Formal Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games
Julio Gonzalez-Diaz and Miguel Melendez-Jimenez
1445: Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk
Maria Goltsman , Johannes Horner , Gregory Pavlov and Francesco Squintani
1444: Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency
Adam Tauman Kalai , Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet
1443: Signalling with Career Concerns
Kim-Sau Chung and Peter Eso
1442: Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules
Bard Hastad (Bard Harstad )
1441: A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt
Marco Battaglini and Stephen Coate
1440: When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
Olivier Gossner and Jöhannes Horner
1439: An Approach to Bounded Rationality
Eli Ben-Sasson , Adam Tauman Kalai and Ehud Kalai
1438: Voting in small networks with cross-pressure
Ascensión Andina-Díaz and Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
1437: Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information
Alp E. Atakan
1436: Incentives for Quality through Endogenous Routing
Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu , Jan A. Van Mieghem and R. Canan Savaskan
1435: Fat Products
Alexei Alexandrov
1434: Vote Bying I: General Elections
Eddie Dekel , Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinksy
1433: Vote Buying II: Legislatures and Lobbying
Eddie Dekel , Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinksy
1432: Parental Guidance and Supervised Learning
Alessandro Lizzeri and Marciano Siniscalchi
1431: Structural Robustness of Large Games
Ehud Kalai