Unobserved Delegation

Chaim Fershtman () and Ehud Kalai

No 1043, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: The paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potentiual for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability.

Date: 1993-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: Unobserved Delegation (1993)
Journal Article: Unobserved Delegation (1997)
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