Rationalizable outcomes of large independent private-value first-price discrete auctions

Eddie Dekel () and Asher Wolinsky

No 1321, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Date: 2001-05
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Related works:
Working Paper: Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First Price Discrete Auctions (2000)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions (2000)
Working Paper: Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Independent Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions (2000)
Journal Article: Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions
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