Partially-Specified Large Games

Ehud Kalai

No 1403, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully speci?ed. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More- over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi- anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; ex-post Nash; structural robustness; metagames (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-09
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Working Paper: Partially-Specified Large Games (2005)
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