Vote Bying I: General Elections

Eddie Dekel (), Matthew O. Jackson () and Asher Wolinksy

No 1434, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al- lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec- tion. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.

Keywords: vote buying; political economy; campaign promises. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
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