Games in Coalitional Form

Ehud Kalai

No 1449, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: How should a coalition of cooperating players allocate payoffs to its members? This question arises in a broad range of situations and evokes an equally broad range of issues. For example, it raises technical issues in accounting, if the players are divisions of a corporation, but involves issues of social justice when the context is how people behave in society. Despite the breadth of possible applications, coalitional game theory offers a uni ed framework and solutions for addressing such questions. This brief survey presents some of its major models and proposed solutions.

Keywords: Stock Options; Incentives; Agency Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D82 D86 J33 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2007-06

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