Tougher Educational Exam Leading to Worse Selection

Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade and Luciano Irineu de Castro ()

No 1469, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: This paper shows a somehow counterintuitive result: an increase in the exam diculty may reduce the average quality (productivity) of selected individuals. Since the exam does not verify all skills, when its standard rises, candidates with relatively low skills emphasized in the test and high skills demanded in the job may no longer qualify. Hence, an increase in the testing standard may be counterproductive. One implication is that policies should emphasize alignment between the skills tested and those required in the actual jobs.

Keywords: school standard; signaling model; cognitive skill; noncog- nitive skill (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-lab
Date: 2008-09
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