Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria

Steven A. Matthews (), Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Andrew Postlewaite ()

No 892R, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on he concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and weak announcement-proofness.

Date: 1990-06
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Journal Article: Refining cheap-talk equilibria (1991)
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