Discussion Papers from University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics
Abstract:
An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behavior is typically hidden from the researcher. We present a simple model showing that one can identify gaming by estimating the correlation between a performance measure and the true goal of the organization before and after the measure has been activated. Our hypothesis is that gaming takes place if this correlation decreases with activation. Using data from a public sector organization, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. We draw implications for the selection of performance measures.
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A. http://www.albany.ed ... /workingp/index.html
More papers in Discussion Papers from University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics Address: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A. Series data maintained by John Bailey Jones ().
This site is part of RePEc
and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to
contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .