Strategic Substitutes and Potential Games

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

No 02-02, Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that games of strategic substitutes (or complements) with aggregation are "pseudo-potential" games, and therefore possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models.

JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nys:sunysb:02-02

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