Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

Luisa Carpente, Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, Casas-Mendez, Balbina and Anne van den Nouweland
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Luisa Carpente: Universidade da Coruna
Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Casas-Mendez, Balbina: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games.

JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
Date: 2003-02-27
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