The Shapley valuation function for strategic games in which players cooperate

Luisa Carpente, Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio, Casas-Mendez, Balbina and Anne van den Nouweland ()
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Luisa Carpente: Universidade da Coruna
Garcia-Jurado, Ignacio: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Casas-Mendez, Balbina: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
Anne van den Nouweland: University of Oregon

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these playersÂ’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lowervalue based method to associate coalitional games with strategic games that was introduced in Carpente et al. (2003). We discuss axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley valuation function.

JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02-19
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