Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment

George William Evans () and Seppo Mikko Sakari Honkapohja ()

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: This is a revised and shortened version of Working Paper 2002-11. Commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commitment policy. We assess these rules in terms of whether they lead to an RE equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private expectations performs particularly well on both counts.

Keywords: Commitment; interest rate setting; adaptive learning; stability; determinacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E31 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2002-05-27
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://economics.uor ... Evans_Commitment.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment (2002)
Working Paper: Monetary policy; expectations and commitment (2002)
Working Paper: Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment (2004)
Journal Article: Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Bill Harbaugh ().