Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition

Christopher Ellis (), Oguzhan Dincer and Glen Waddell ()
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Christopher Ellis: University of Oregon

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: Several empirical studies have found a negative relationship between corruption and the decentralization of the powers to tax and spend. In this paper we explain this phenomenon using a model of Yardstick Competition. Using data on federal corruption-related convictions in U.S. states we propose and test a spatial autoregressive model of corruption, providing new evidence in support of the theoretical findings.

Keywords: Corruption; decentralization; yardstick competition; spatial autoregression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-reg
Date: Written
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-5

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