Structural Estimation of Sequential Games of Complete Information
Jason Blevins ()
No 14-01, Working Papers from Ohio State University, Department of Economics
In models of strategic interaction, there may be important order of entry effects if one player can credibly commit to an action (e.g., entry) before other players. If one estimates a simultaneous-move model, then the move-order effects will be confounded with the payoffs. This paper considers nonparametric identification and simulation-based estimation of sequential games of complete information. Relative to simultaneous-move games, these models avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and require fewer payoff normalizations. We apply the estimator in several Monte Carlo experiments and to study entry-order effects using data from the airline industry.
Keywords: static games; sequential games; identification; simulation-based estimation; airline industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 C15 C35 C72 L13 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ecm, nep-gth and nep-ore
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Journal Article: STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION (2015)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osu:osuewp:14-01
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