Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby`s and Christie`s

Kathryn Graddy () and Orley Ashenfelter ()

No 203, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: The Sotheby`s/Christie`s price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked, and the economic conditions under which it was started and began to fall apart. The outcome of the case also provides evidence on the novel auction process used to choose the lead counsel for the civil settlement. Finally, though buyers received the bulk of the damages, a straightforward application of the economic theory of auctions shows that it is unlikely that successful buyers as a group were injured.

Keywords: Auctions; Price-Fixing; Cartels; Antitrust; Commissions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Research/wp/pdf/paper203.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's (2004)
Working Paper: Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby’s and Christie’s (2004)
Working Paper: Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:203

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Mark George ().