When An Evolutionary Analysis of the Volunteer`s Dilemma

David Peter Myatt and Chris Wallace

No 270, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: The volunteer`s dilemma is an asymmetric n-player binary-action game in which a public good is provided if and only if at least one player volunteers, and consequently bears some private cost. So long as the value generated for every player exceeds this private cost there are n pure-strategy Nash equilibria in each of which a single player volunteers. Quantal-response strategy revisions allow play to move between the different equilibria. A complete characterisation of long-run play as strategy revisions approximate best replies provides an equilibrium selection device. The volunteer need not be the lowest-cost player: relatively high-cost, but nonetheless "stable" players may instead provide the public good. The cost of provision is (weakly) reduced when higher values are associated with lower costs.

Keywords: Volunteer`s Dilemma; Public Goods; Evolution; Equilibrium Selection; Concordance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-pbe
Date: 2006
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