Merger stability in a three firm game

Duarte Brito and João Gata ()
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João Gata: Autoridade da Concorrência and Universidade de Aveiro and UECE/ISEG-UTL

No 10, Working Papers from Portuguese Competition Authority

Abstract: We compare different notions of stability in three firm merger games. We discuss some of their shortcomings and introduce an alternative notion of stability which overcomes them. The paper concludes with an illustrative example.

Keywords: endogenous mergers; stability; core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 2006-01
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http://www.concorrencia.pt/download/WP10_merger_st ... e_firm_game_(wp).pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pca:wpaper:10

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