Dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and strategic buyers

Gary Biglaiser () and Nikolaos Vettas ()
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Gary Biglaiser: University of North Carolina
Nikolaos Vettas: Athens University of Economics and Business

No 24, Working Papers from Portuguese Competition Authority

Abstract: We analyze a dynamic durable good oligopoly model where sellers are capacity constrained over the length of the game. Buyers act strategically in the market, knowing that their purchases may affect future prices. The model is examined when there is one and multiple buyers. Sellers choose their capacities at the start of the game. We find that there are only mixed strategy equilibria. Buyers may split orders, preferring to buy a unit from both high and low price sellers to buying all units from the low price seller. Sellers enjoy a rent above the amount needed to satisfy the market demand that the other seller cannot meet. Buyers would like to commit not to buy in the future or hire agents with instructions to always buy from the lowest priced seller. Further, sellers’ market shares tend to be asymmetric with high probability, even though they are ex ante identical.

Keywords: Strategic buyers; capacity constraints; bilateral oligopoly; dynamic competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse and nep-mic
Date: 2007-06
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http://www.concorrencia.pt/download/WP24_BiglaiserVettas.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pca:wpaper:24

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