Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

João Vareda ()
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João Vareda: Autoridade da Concorrência

No 30, Working Papers from Portuguese Competition Authority

Abstract: We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant?s decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to fi?rst best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the ?first best.

Keywords: Access Pricing; Asymmetric Information; Signaling; Revelation principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D92 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-reg
Date: 2007-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pca:wpaper:30

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