Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

Helder Vasconcelos and Helder Vasconcelos ()
Additional contact information
Helder Vasconcelos: Universidade Católica Portuguesa and CEPR
Helder Vasconcelos: Universidade Católica Portuguesa and CEPR
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Helder Vasconcelos ()

No 33, Working Papers from Portuguese Competition Authority

Abstract: The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable grim trigger strategies available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.

Keywords: Collusion; Demand Growth and Entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Date: 2008-06

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.concorrencia.pt/download/WP33_D-Growth-JEMS-FINAL.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets (2008)
Journal Article: Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pca:wpaper:33

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Portuguese Competition Authority
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Duarte Brito ().