Papers of Peter Cramton

from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211.
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12cshtf: How to Fix the Inefficiency of Global Cap and Trade

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

12csgcg: Global Climate Games: How Pricing and a Green Fund Foster Cooperation

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

12cocap: Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector

Peter Cramton and Axel Ockenfels

12cmaft: Medicare Auction Reform

Peter Cramton

12cmafc: Response to the Congressional Hearing on Medicare's Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program

Peter Cramton

12chcfma: The Hidden Costs of a Flawed Medicare Auction

Peter Cramton

12cfosf: Fear of Losing in a Clock Auction

Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Y. Ozbay and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta

12cfosdca: Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study

Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Y. Ozbay and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta

12cekdtf: Designed to Fail: The Medicare Auction for Durable Medical Equipment

Peter Cramton

12acmhc: System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction

Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom

12acmec: System and Method for the Efficient Clearing of Spectrum Encumbrances

Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom

11marv: Medicare Auction Reform

Peter Cramton

11lto: Letter from 244 Concerned Auction Experts on the Medicare Competitive Bidding Program

Peter Cramton

11iauc: Incentive Auctions

Peter Cramton

11iat: Incentive Auctions and Spectrum Policy

Peter Cramton

11cocaps: Ökonomik und Design von Kapazitätsmärkten im Stromsektor

Peter Cramton and Axel Ockenfels

11cmaf: Medicare Auction Failure: Early Evidence from the Round 1 Rebid

Peter Cramton

11ckrs: Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston and Andrzej Skrzypacz

11ckev: Early Pilots of Medicare Auctions Bring No Solace to Auction Experts

Peter Cramton

11cadm: Auction Design for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment

Peter Cramton

11acmf: Multiple Factor Auction Design for Wind Rights

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

11acjam: System and Method for an Auction of Multiple Types of Items

Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Wynne P. Jones

11accw: Comparison of Auction Formats for Auctioning Wind Rights

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

11acar: Activity Rules for the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

11acadw: Auction Design for Wind Rights

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

10wec: Wind Energy in Colombia: A Framework for Market Entry

Walter Vergara, Alejandro Deeb, Natsuko Toba, Peter Cramton and Irene Leino

10pbcc: Price is a Better Climate Commitment

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

10ltcs: Letter from 167 Concerned Auction Experts on Medicare Competitive Bidding Program

Peter Cramton

10kcg: Kyoto’s Climate Game and How to Fix It

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

10icg: International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

10dca: Discrete Clock Auctions: An Experimental Study

Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Y. Ozbay and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta

10cmd: Market Design: Harnessing Market Methods to Improve Resource Allocation

Peter Cramton

10cmac: Medicare Auction Conference

Peter Cramton

10ckrhc: Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design

Peter Cramton

10cgsma: An Auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment: Evidence from an Industry Mock Auction

Peter Cramton, Ulrich Gall and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta

10ard: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton’s Ekati Diamonds

Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin and Robert Butler Wilson

10acmhc: System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction

Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom

10acfm: Fix Medicare’s Bizarre Auction Program

Ian Ayres and Peter Cramton

09vpp: Virtual Power Plant Auctions

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

09ufm: Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

09tsall: A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

09sad: Spectrum Auction Design

Peter Cramton

09prca: Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction

Peter Cramton and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta

09msab: Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

09mdc: Market Design: Auctions and Matching

Peter Cramton

09imd: Innovation and Market Design

Peter Cramton

09gcp: Global Carbon Pricing: A Better Climate Commitment

Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft

09fop: No Substitute for the 'P'-Word in Financial Rescue

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton

09cvawln: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction

Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Y. Ozbay and Andrew J. Stocking

09ccpre: Prediction Markets to Forecast Electricity Demand

Luciano I. de Castro and Peter Cramton