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Papers of Peter Cramton
from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211. Series data maintained by Peter Cramton ().
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10pbcc: Price is a Better Climate Commitment
Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft
09vpp: Virtual Power Plant Auctions
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
09ufm: Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
09tsall: A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
09sad: Spectrum Auction Design
Peter Cramton
09prca: Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
Peter Cramton and Pacharasut Sujarittanonta
09msab: Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
09mdc: Market Design: Auctions and Matching
Peter Cramton
09imd: Innovation and Market Design
Peter Cramton
09gcp: Global Carbon Pricing: A Better Climate Commitment
Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft
09fop: No Substitute for the 'P'-Word in Financial Rescue
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
09cvawln: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction
Lawrence M. Ausubel , Peter Cramton , Emel Filiz-Ozbay , Nathaniel Higgins , Erkut Ozbay and Andrew J. Stocking
09anr: How Best to Auction Natural Resources
Peter Cramton
09aibc: Auctions for Injecting Bank Capital
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
09aghg: The allocation of permits is an important design aspect of an emissions trading scheme. Traditionally, governments have favoured the free allocation of greenhouse gas permits based on individual historical emissions (‘grandfathering’) or industry benchmark data. Particularly in the EU, the free allocation of permits has proven complex and inefficient and the distributional implications are politically difficult to justify; auctioning emissions permits has therefore become more popular. The EU is now moving to auction more than 50 per cent of all permits in 2013, and in the US the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has begun auctioning more than 90 per cent of total allowances. Another case in point is the Australian proposal for a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), which provides for auctioning a significant share of total permits. This paper discusses the proposed Australian CPRS’s auction design. A major difference to other emissions trading schemes is that the CPRS plans to auction multiple vintages of emissions permits simultaneously
Regina Annette Betz , Stefan Seifert , Peter Cramton and Suzi Kerr
09add: Auctioning the Digital Dividend
Peter Cramton
08tara: A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
08rtfghz: A Review of the 10-40 GHz Auction
Peter Cramton
08rlba: A Review of the L-Band Auction
Peter Cramton
08qcspr: The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule for Combinatorial Auctions
Robert Day and Peter Cramton
08ibsaa: The Effect of Incumbent Bidding in Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis of Prices in the Closed and Open Segments of FCC Auction 35
Peter Cramton , Allan T. Ingraham and Hal J. Singer
08gm: Auctioning Long-term Gas Contracts in Colombia
Peter Cramton
08frm: Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less Market Power, More Efficiency
Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft
08adcfrp: Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
07rggi: Comments on the RGGI Market Design
Peter Cramton
07rev700: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
Peter Cramton , Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Butler Wilson
07oca: An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions
Peter Cramton , Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg
07mbac: Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York’s LaGuardia Airport
Michael O. Ball , Lawrence M. Ausubel , Frank Berardino , Peter Cramton , George Donohue , Mark Hansen and Karla Hoffman
07fem: Colombia’s Forward Energy Market
Peter Cramton
07fcc700mhz: Comments on the FCC’s Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73
Peter Cramton , Gregory Rosston , Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Butler Wilson
07entry700mhz: Essential Entry: Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
Peter Cramton
07el700mhz: Economist Letter to NTIA on 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
Peter Cramton , Andrzej Skrzypacz , Simon Wilkie and Robert Butler Wilson
07d700mhz: Economic Comments on the Design of the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction
Peter Cramton , Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Butler Wilson
07cpm: Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets
Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft
07cfem: Colombia Firm Energy Market
Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft
07c700mhz: The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry
Peter Cramton , Andrzej Skrzypacz and Robert Butler Wilson
06scfem: Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market
Peter Cramton , Steven Stoft and Jeffrey West
06oil: How Best to Auction Oil Rights
Peter Cramton
06mdfra: The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity
Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft
05mdi: Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England
Peter Cramton , Hung-po Chao and Robert Butler Wilson
05licap: A Capacity Market that Makes Sense
Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft
04mit5: The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
Lawrence M. Ausubel , Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom
04mit4: Simultaneous Ascending Auction
Peter Cramton
04mit: Combinatorial Auctions
Peter Cramton , Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg
04jeea: Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
04hicss: Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets
Peter Cramton
03ferc2: Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties
Peter Cramton
03ferc1: Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets
Peter Cramton
02ubs: Unions, Bargaining and Strikes
Peter Cramton and Joseph Tracy
02eptc: Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather
Peter Cramton and Suzi Kerr