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A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans
Lawrence M. Ausubel () and
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Lawrence M. Ausubel: Economics Department, University of Maryland, http://www.econ.umd.edu
Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton
On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.
Keywords: Auctions; financial auctions; financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-exp
Date: 2009, Revised 2009
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Published in Working Paper, University of Maryland, March 2009
Downloads: (external link) http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/ausubel ... acy-loan-auction.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:09tsall
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