Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions

Peter Cramton (), John McMillan, Paul Milgrom (), Bradley Miller (), Bridger Mitchell (), Daniel Vincent () and Robert Butler Wilson ()

Papers of Peter Cramton from University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton

Abstract: We evaluate a number of possible enhancements to the FCC auctions. We consider only changes to the current auction rules that stay within the basic format of the simultaneous multiple round auction for individual licenses. This report summarizes and extends our e-mail exchanges with FCC staff on this topic. A subsequent report will cover auctions with combination bids. Overall, the FCC spectrum auctions have been an enormous success. However, there are two design goals in the auction where important improvement can be achieved within the basic rules structure. These are restricting collusion among bidders and reducing the time taken to complete the auction. This report focuses on enhancements that help to achieve these two goals. Some of the suggested changes also streamline the auction process so large auctions can be conducted more quickly without sacrificing efficiency.

Keywords: Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Multiple-Round Auctions; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D61 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-09

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97cra

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