Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath () and Stephen Morris ()

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play.

Keywords: repeated games; private monitoring; almost-public monitoring; coordination; bounded recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2004-08-20
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Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2006)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Journal Article: Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:04-033

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