Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli () and Andrew Postlewaite ()

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides whether to void or uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court, the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex-post. There are two effects of a court that voids more contracts. The parties’ incentives to undertake relationship-specific investment are reduced, while the parties enjoy greater insurance against the unforeseen contingencies which the ex-ante contract cannot take into account. In this context, we are able to characterize fully the optimal decision rule for the court. The behavior of the optimal court is determined by the tradeoff between the need for incentives and the gains from insurance that voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents.

Keywords: Courts of Law; Unforeseen Contingencies; Precedents; Incentives; Insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D74 D89 K40 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-law
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies
Working Paper: Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (2001)
Working Paper: Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (2003)
Journal Article: Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:06-001

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