Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version

V Bhaskar, George J. Mailath () and Stephen Morris ()

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and Välimäki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring. We find that any such strategy profile is not the limit of one-period memory equilibrium strategy profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distributions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable.

Keywords: Purification; belief-free equilibria; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2006-07-13, Revised 2007-08-20
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/07-024.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:07-024

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Address: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Dolly Guarini ().