Inside the black box of collective reputation

Stefano Castriota and Marco Delmastro ()

No 89/2011, Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica from Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica

Abstract: The literature on collective reputation is still in its infancy. Despite the existence of a (limited) number of valuable theoretical works studying the process of collective reputation building, there is still no comprehensive analysis of this concept. In addition, due to data limitation, there are no empirical studies testing the determinants of group reputation. This work intends to provide a comprehensive analysis of reputational equilibria within coalitions of agents. In order to do so, we design a static and dynamic (over 30 years) study on the universe of coalitions of companies, within the wine market, looking at the role exerted by the characteristics of the coalition itself (its age and size), the rules set and the actions put forward by the group of agents in order to reach and maintain a certain level of collective reputation, and the context in which they operate. Results shed new lights into this ubiquitous phenomenon.

Keywords: reputation; collective reputation; asymmetric information; quality standards; wine. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm and nep-net
Date: 2011-04-15
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