Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation

John Duffy (), Andreas Blume and April Franco ()

No 310, Working Papers from University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics

Abstract: We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning that provides sharp predictions as to how learning members of an organization might cope with the simultaneous learning of others as a function of fundamental variables, e.g., firm size and the discount factor. While the problem of learning while others are learning is quite difficult, we find support for the comparative static predictions of the model's unique symmetric equilibrium.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 C92 D23 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe and nep-exp
Date: 2007-05, Revised 2008-07
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Forthcoming in the American Economic Review

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Related works:
Working Paper: Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation (2009)
Journal Article: Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pit:wpaper:310

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