Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities

László Á. Kóczy ()

No 801, Working Paper Series from Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics

Abstract: The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core.

Keywords: Core; externalities; sequential coalition formation; order-independent equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2006-02
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Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior

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http://www.bmf.hu/us ... /pkk/wpaper/0801.pdf Author's Accepted Manuscript, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities (2006)
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