Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions

László Á. Kóczy ()

No 803, Working Paper Series from Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics

Abstract: While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.

Keywords: Banzhaf index; Shapley-Shubik index; a priori voting power; rational players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Date: 2006-05, Revised 2008-05

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0803

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