Proportional power is free from paradoxes

László Á. Kóczy ()

No 806, Working Paper Series from Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics

Abstract: We modify the story behind the Shapley-Shubik power index and apply it to a legislative body. The resulting proportional index may be trivial, but is free from the paradoxical behaviour observable with standard power indices. The widespread use of this index may in fact be the reason for these \paradoxes".

Keywords: a priori voting power; paradox of large size; paradox of new members; paradox of quarrelling members; Gamson's Law. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2008-05, Revised 2008-05

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0806

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