Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility

Péter Csóka (), P. Jean-Jacques Herings (), László Á. Kóczy () and Miklós Pintér ()

No 904, Working Paper Series from Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics

Abstract: We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of \Pi-balanced, totally \Pi-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.

Keywords: NTU Games; Exact Games; Convex Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
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Working Paper: Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility (2009)
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