Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks

László Á. Kóczy () and Dávid Csercsik

No 1103, Working Paper Series from Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management

Abstract: An electrical transmission network consists of producers, consumers and the power lines connecting them. We build an ideal (lossless) DC load ow model as a cooperative game over a graph with the producers and consumers located at the nodes, each described by a maximum supply or desired demand and the power lines represented by the edges, each with a given power transmission capacity and admittance value describing its ability to transmit electricity. Today's transmission networks are highly interconnected, but or- ganisationally partitioned into several subnetworks, the so-called bal- ancing groups with balanced production and consumption. We study the game of balancing group formation and show that the game con- tains widespread externalities that can be both negative and positive. We study the stability of the transportation network using the recur- sive core. While the game is clearly cohesive, we demonstrate that it is not necessarily superadditive. We argue that subadditivity may be a barrier to achieve full cooperation. Finally the model is extended to allow for the extension of the underlying transmission network.

Keywords: Energy transmission networks; Coop- erative game theory; Partition function form games; Externalities; Energy transmission networks; Coop- erative game theory; Partition function form games; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-gth and nep-net
Date: 2011
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http://uni-obuda.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/1103.pdf Manuscript, 2011 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks (2011)
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