Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments

Somdeb Lahiri ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to manipulate market equilibrium by destroying and withholding ones initial endowments.

JEL-codes: C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008-08-08
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http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10026/

Related works:
Working Paper: Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:10026

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