Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment

Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment

Anna Rita Germani (), Andrea Morone () and Piergiuseppe Morone ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this work, we conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test the findings of a theoretical environmental enforcement model played as a strategic game where the firm’s behavior is influenced by the course of actions discretionally undertaken by both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Our experimental findings suggest that the presence of the DOJ can be counterproductive in increasing social welfare, since it implies solely additional enforcement costs, which, in turn, might reduce the probability of conducting inspections by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance.

Keywords: classroom experiments; environmental enforcement; environmental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q50 O13 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-exp
Date: 2009-01
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12735

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