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Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

Attila Tasnádi ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

Keywords: Forchheimer; Dominant firm; Price leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 2009-02-24
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http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13612/ original version (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:13612

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