Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices

Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price.

Keywords: Auctions; ceilings; collusion; reserve prices. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2006-12
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http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1503/

Related works:
Working Paper: Controlling collusion in auctions: The Role of ceilings and reserve prices (2007)
Journal Article: Controlling collusion in auctions: The role of ceilings and reserve prices (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1503

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