Yours, Mine, and Ours: The Effect of Ersatz Property Rights on Outcome Based Fairness and Reciprocity

Robert J. Oxoby () and John Michael Spraggon ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We report laboratory data on earned wealth effects in a series of anonymous dictator games. In addition to a standard (baseline) treatment in which wealth was determined by the experimenter, we conduct treatments in which either the dictator or the receiver earned wealth used in the subsequent dictator game. In our baseline treatment, we observe the standard result: on average, dictators allocate receivers twenty percent. In treatments where the dictator earned wealth, we observe the theoretic prediction of zero offers to receivers. In treatments where the receiver earned wealth, we observe distributions of offers in which the receiver’s share exceeds fifty percent. We interpret these results as evidence of the importance of property rights in determining individuals’ social preferences.

Keywords: Dictator Games; Property Rights; Social Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 C91 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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