The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence

Jed DeVaro and Michael Waldman ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: An extensive theoretical literature has developed that investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability. There have been no tests, however, of the empirical validity of this idea. In this paper we develop the theory in a manner that allows us to generate testable predictions, and then investigate the validity of these predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal-labor-market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry. Our results support the notion that signaling is both a statistically significant and economically significant factor in promotion decisions. The paper also contributes to the extensive literature on the role of education as a labor-market signal.

Keywords: signaling theory; promotions; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
Date: 2006-12
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:1550

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